Tuesday, 5 January 2010

Threshold of Semiotics


A recurring problem in Zoosemiotics and Biosemiotics is that of sign awareness or recognition threshold. In other words, what is the simplest life form that is capable of sign awareness? What is required to be aware of a relation between A & B? Awareness of a relation is not the same as responding or reacting to a stimulus in an instinctive or mechanical  manner. Another important point is that the sign awareness must be from the organism's point of view and not from the human observer's pov (i.e., descriptive semiotics). We can  attribute semiotic communication to lower life forms, but this attribution is descriptive. This is a very important point since many researchers forget this. I have in my various  articles reiterated this point, one shared by critics of biosemiotics (including leading  cognitive semioticians ). I have argued that for an animal to be aware of a relationship there must be a neural working space in which signals from two or more modalities are dealt with. A bacterium when it handles information does it moreorless in the same manner as receptor cells do. The difference is that a bacterium has a freer organization (an independent life form) but discrete network. While it is true that a bacterium signals to a community at large, however the propagation and reception of the message is mechanistic, quantifiable, and very basic. Even the collective memory of the bacteria is limited in comparison to the memory found in the simplest multicellular life forms. The quorum sensing for example in bacteria is at the level of biochemistry, whereas in honeybees the swarming activity is more  distal. Of course, when we look at the behaviour and communication of a bacterium, or for that matter a virus, we see that there is still a qualitative difference between their memory and signalling systems and say stars and radios. Those qualities are subjective, connected with the awareness of sensing - sensation. A bacterium does not have a proper sense of body, as it does not have a CPU which manages the signals, instead it has biochemical structures and processes that register chemically changes - such changes occur in us automatically in our cells, and we are not conscious of them. When we compare the processing of external and internal information in the first animals proper, we find that it is less freely distributed, and more centrally controlled than in unicellular life forms. The moon jellyfish has for example eight mini CPU (marginals) that process multisensory information. These marginals constitute a cognitive working space. In addition to this, although the jellyfish lacks the capacity for true image-making, (85 % of animals have this capacity), I have hypothesized that activity connected with food, particularly troublesome fish larvae, may be registered as a "flash" in the visual context - this forming the basis for later inner representations. In otherwords primordial semiosis (awareness of signs) could be synaesthetic. Certainly, the hypothesis would be in accordance with classical semiotics where the image is paramount. From my perspective semiosis (sign awareness/consciousness should be seen in a natural continuum and viewed exactly as other evolutionary traits using the tests of evolutionary biology. Our ability to be or see relations in nature and use a token to stand for these, has evolved from simpler systems. The gulf between the linguistic and nonlinguistic systems is a different problem. If we move from the moon jellyfish (radial design) towards the bilateral design, we see that cephalization brings new and more advanced attention/focus systems which are qualitatively different from the radial design. Attention and saliency antcipates consciosness and meaning. Quite how, will be the subject of further discussion.            

2 comments:

  1. With regard to the nature of the sign. I have proposed that there are two or three alternatives 1) that the sign falls within a evolutionary continuum of communication and that language should be seen in those terms 2) there exists an evolutionary firewall between the state of nonlinguistic and linguistic communication 3) semiotic communication does not exist at all except in a linguistic context.

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  2. I prefer 1) as it fits into general evolutionary theory, whereby through a set of commonalities (genetic, environmental constraints) there has been seen throughout the history of animals common designs/adaptation. For example the design of the eye has occurred independently from different evolutionary starting points, and because of common physical constraints, the resulting designs are very similar. While it is true that six or seven million years separate humans from other primate "cousins" and that two or three amino acids are behind the evolutionary tweaking of the language gene(s), plus the complexity of the brain after the "Great Cephalization", despite all this, there are enough commonalities to talk of a continuum in communication design, including here how information is represented to the organism subjectively as in sensation, perception, recognition and interpretation. However there are incredible quantitative and qualitative differences in these subjective experiences of the inner and outer "worlds". Humans for example, spend a lot more time in internal worlds that are for some examples of emergent cognition. It is also not sufficient to argue that mollusks have a lot of the same neurochemicals as humans. They do not think or feel as we do. Their world is primarily one of response/reflex/reaction. However this is coloured and qualified by the kind of interaction as well as differences in their own neural systems.

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